European Court of Human Rights : Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, OOO Flavus and others v. Russia, Bulgakov v. Russia and Engels v. Russia by Voorhoof, Dirk
ECtHR: Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, OOO Flavus and 
Others v. Russia, Bulgakov v. Russia and Engels v. Russi
a
IRIS 2020-8:1/11
Dirk Voorhoof
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy
In four judgments of 23 June 2020, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
found that the blocking of websites and media platforms in Russia had violated 
the right to freedom of expression and information as guaranteed by Article 10 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The cases concern different 
types of blocking measures, including collateral blocking (where the IP address 
that was blocked was shared with other sites), excessive blocking (where the 
whole website was blocked because of a single page or file) and wholesale 
blocking of media outlets for their news coverage. One case concerns a court 
order to remove a webpage with a description of tools and software for bypassing 
restrictions on private communications and content filters on the Internet, 
otherwise, the website would be blocked. The ECtHR once again highlighted the 
importance of the Internet as a vital tool in exercising the right to freedom of 
expression. It found that the provisions of Russia’s Information Act, which was 
used to block the websites and online media outlets, had produced excessive and 
arbitrary effects and had not provided proper safeguards against abusive 
interferences by the Russian authorities. In each of the four cases, the ECtHR also 
found a violation of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR: it 
found that the Russian courts had not carried out examinations of the substance 
of what had been arguable complaints of violations of the applicant’s rights and 
that none of the remedies available to the applicants had been effective.
In the case of Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, the owner of a website lodged a 
court complaint, arguing that a blocking order by the Russian telecoms regulator 
(Roskomnadzor) against another website containing allegedly illegal content had 
also blocked access to his website, being hosted under the same IP address, but 
not containing any illegal content. The courts upheld Roskomnadzor’s action as 
lawful without however assessing its impact on the applicant’s website. In the 
OOO Flavus and Others v. Russia case, the applicants owned opposition media 
outlets which publish research and analysis that is critical of the Russian 
Government. After Roskomnadzor, on request of the Prosecutor General, blocked 
access to their websites because they were allegedly promoting acts of mass 
disorder or extremist speech, they unsuccessfully applied for a judicial review of 
the blocking measure. They also complained about the wholesale blocking of 
access to their websites, and of a lack of notice of the specific offending material, 
which they could therefore not remove in order to have access to their website 
restored. The case of Bulgakov v. Russia concerns the blocking of a website by a 
local Internet service on the basis of a court judgment. The reason for the 
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blocking was the availability of an electronic book in the files section of the 
website; a book which had been previously categorised as an extremist 
publication. Bulgakov deleted the e-book as soon as he found out about the 
court’s judgment, but the Russian courts refused to lift the blocking measure on 
the grounds that the court had initially ordered a block on access to the entire 
website by its IP address, not just to the offending material. In Engels v. Russia, a 
court ordered a local Internet service provider to remove a webpage that 
contained information about bypassing content filters. It was argued that such 
information should be prohibited from dissemination in Russia as it enabled users 
to access extremist material on another, unrelated website. Following the court 
order, Roskomnadzor asked Engels to take down the offending content, 
otherwise the website would be blocked. Engels complied with the request, and 
at the same time lodged an appeal against the court order. However, Engels’ 
complaint was rejected without addressing his main argument that providing 
information about tools and software for the protection of the privacy of browsing 
was not against any Russian law.
All the applicants complained in essence that the blocking of access to their 
websites or Internet platforms had been unlawful and disproportionate, and had 
therefore violated their rights under Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR, in all four 
judgments, confirmed the importance it attaches to the right to freedom of 
expression on the Internet, referring to its earlier case law on the (wholesale) 
blocking of websites in which it took the approach "that owing to its accessibility 
and capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet 
has now become one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their 
right to freedom of expression and information. The Internet provides essential 
tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and 
issues of general interest, it enhances the public’s access to news and facilitates 
the dissemination of information in general" (see also Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, 
Iris 2013-2/1). The ECtHR also recalled that the blocking of websites by rendering 
large quantities of information inaccessible substantially restricted the rights of 
Internet users and had a significant collateral effect. It added that the wholesale 
blocking of access to a website is an extreme measure which has been compared 
to banning a newspaper or television station. In all four cases, the ECtHR found a 
violation of Article 10 also in combination with Article 13.
In the case of Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, the ECtHR came to the conclusion 
that it was incompatible with the rule of law if a legal framework failed to 
establish safeguards capable of protecting individuals from the excessive and 
arbitrary effects of blocking measures, such as those imposed on the basis of 
section 15.1 of the Russian Information Act. When exceptional circumstances 
justify the blocking of illegal content, the state agency making the blocking order 
must ensure that the measure strictly targets the illegal content and has no 
arbitrary or excessive effects, irrespective of the manner of its implementation. 
Any indiscriminate blocking measure which interferes with lawful content or 
websites as a collateral effect of a measure aimed at illegal content or websites 
amounts to arbitrary interference with the rights of the owners of such websites. 
The ECtHR found that the blocking order did not satisfy the foreseeability 
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requirement under the ECHR and did not afford the applicant the degree of 
protection from abuse to which he was entitled by the rule of law in a democratic 
society.
In OOO Flavus and Others v. Russia, the ECtHR found that the decision by the 
Prosecutor General to qualify the content of the media outlets at issue as 
extremist speech had no basis in fact and was therefore arbitrary and manifestly 
unreasonable. The ECtHR held that targeting online media or websites with 
blocking measures because they are critical of the government or the political 
system can never be considered a necessary restriction on freedom of 
expression, and it also found that the blocking orders had no legitimate aim and 
were not necessary in a democratic society. Furthermore, it came to the 
conclusion that Russian legislation did not afford the applicants the degree of 
protection from abuse to which they were entitled by the rule of law in a 
democratic society, taking into consideration the fact that the ECtHR also found 
in other cases against Russia that is was difficult, if not impossible, to challenge a 
blocking measure on judicial review (see also Kablis v. Russia, IRIS 2019-7/1).
In Bulgakov v. Russia, the ECtHR emphasised that blocking access to a website’s 
IP address has the practical effect of extending the scope of the blocking order 
far beyond the illegal content which had originally been targeted. Apart from 
having no legal basis, the Court also found that there were no sufficient 
procedural safeguards to protect individuals from the excessive and arbitrary 
effects of blocking measures, such as in the case at issue. The Russian courts 
also neglected to consider whether the same result could be achieved with less 
intrusive means or to carry out an impact assessment of the blocking measure to 
ensure that it strictly targets the illegal content and has no arbitrary or excessive 
effects, including those resulting from the method chosen to implement it.
In Engels v. Russia, the ECtHR found that the legal provision of the Information 
Act on which the blocking order was based was too vague and overly broad to 
satisfy the foreseeability requirement. The ECtHR also noted that the utility of 
filter-bypassing technologies cannot be reduced to a tool for malevolently 
seeking to obtain extremist content. Even though the use of any information 
technology can be subverted to carry out activities which are incompatible with 
the principles of a democratic society, filter-bypassing technologies primarily 
serve a multitude of legitimate purposes, such as enabling secure links to remote 
servers; channelling data through faster servers to reduce page-loading time on 
slow connections; and providing a quick and free online translation. None of 
these legitimate uses were considered by the Russian court before issuing the 
blocking order; it merely focused on the possibility that filter-bypassing software 
could give access to extremist content. The ECtHR clarified that information 
technologies are content-neutral and that they are a means of storing and 
accessing: "Just as a printing press can be used to print anything from a school 
textbook to an extremist pamphlet, the Internet preserves and makes available a 
wealth of information, some portions of which may be proscribed for a variety of 
reasons particular to specific jurisdictions. Suppressing information about the 
technologies for accessing information online on the grounds they may 
incidentally facilitate access to extremist material is no different from seeking to 
IRIS Merlin
© European Audiovisual Observatory (Council of Europe) 2020 
Page 3
restrict access to printers and photocopiers because they can be used for 
reproducing such material. The blocking of information about such technologies 
interferes with access to all content which might be accessed using those 
technologies." In the absence of a specific legal basis in domestic law, the ECtHR 
found that the "sweeping measure" in the case of Engels was not only excessive, 
but also arbitrary. Furthermore, during the subsequent procedures, Engels was 
not afforded the degree of protection from abuse to which he was entitled by the 
rule of law in a democratic society.
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